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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff(s), No. C 09-1826 BZ ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AS TO ALL REMAINING HILO MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,) DEFENDANTS Defendant(s).

(see Doc. No. 56) is **DENIED**. Plaintiffs already received a chance to amend their complaint (see Doc. No. 6, 9) and plaintiffs' first amended complaint failed to address the concerns outlined by the Court in its Order Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend, dated May 13, 2009. (Doc. No. The Court may deny amendment under Rule 15(a) "when amendment would be clearly frivolous, unduly prejudicial, cause undue delay or a finding of bad faith is made." United Union of Roofers v. Ins. Co. of America, 919 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990). A Court may also deny amendment if that amendment would be futile, or if there have been previous

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unsuccessful attempts to cure deficiencies. See Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court has the discretion to determine whether the presence of any of these elements justifies refusal of a request to amend the complaint; this discretion is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Ascon Properties, Inc. v.

Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989).

Based on the Court's understanding of the facts of this case, permitting plaintiffs to further amend their complaint would be futile. Plaintiffs will not be able to cure the deficiencies in their complaint, inasmuch as their first amended complaint is substantively unchanged from the original complaint with respect to all of plaintiffs claims and jurisdictional allegations. Specifically, it appears that plaintiffs claims may be time-barred, but even if plaintiffs overcame this hurdle, their action could not proceed in this Court since they have not alleged any activity that occurred in California or otherwise suggested any basis for this Court to acquire personal jurisdiction over the remaining defendants. "Personal jurisdiction" means the Court has power to render a judgment that commands defendants' obedience or that imposes obligations on defendants enforceable by other courts. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990). From the allegations in both the original as well as the first amended complaint, defendants resided at all relevant times in Hawaii and all of the alleged activity took place in Hawaii.

Because defendants are not present in California, they

must have "certain minimum contacts [with California] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). There is nothing to suggest that defendants have the requisite minimum contacts in California. Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating that the defendants "purposefully availed" themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in California by showing that they engaged in conduct aimed at or having effect in California. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 (9th Cir. 2001). When this issue was discussed at the case management conference, plaintiff Ellis suggested that some defendants might consent to jurisdiction in this district. None have.

Plaintiff Ellis faces another hurdle in that she has failed to timely serve defendants pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Given Ms. Ellis's failure to serve, and given that neither Ms. Ellis nor Mr. Wheeler have alleged facts demonstrating that any of the defendants have sufficient contacts with California to require them to defend themselves in this court, the Court finds that further pursuance of this action would be futile. Accordingly, this action is **DISMISSED** as to all remaining defendants.

Dated: October 6, 2009

Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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